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A B S T R A C T
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is an attempt to bring food
security to 5 million people by providing them with social security to close the
yearly hunger gap, coupled with development projects to lift them permanently
out of poverty. The programme is an example of the new policy arrangements
that aim to link relief to social security and development. This paper analyses the
early implementation of the PSNP in two villages of the Amhara Region. The
paper shows how the programme was in practice interpreted and used by local
authorities to realise a related programme of voluntary resettlement, and how this
locally changed the objective from helping the most vulnerable people, to reser-
ving the beneﬁts of the programme for the more aﬄuent and economically potent
households. It shows how local responses to food security policies were informed
by institutional patterns, discourses about food insecurity and the articulation of
policy with adjacent or past policy practices.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
‘Dawn, and as the sun breaks through the piercing chill of night on the
plain outside Korem it lights up a biblical famine, now, in the twentieth
century. ’ With these words, journalist Michael Buerk famously alerted the
world that a famine was happening in the Horn of Africa in October 1984.
He set into motion a huge response, foremost consisting of food aid for the
starving people of Ethiopia. Since that time, for more than twenty years,
emergency appeals have invited massive food aid to the country, targeted
to more than 5 million people every year, and many more in years of
extreme drought such as 2002 and 2003 (GoE 2004: 1). There is no doubt
that many people in Ethiopia are alive today thanks to the contribution of
food aid. Yet, ironically, throughout this period of massive international
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support, most research maintains that food security in Ethiopia has been
deteriorating. Food production is now less than what it was in 1984, and
subsistence farmers today are poorer than they were then. Nearly half of
the population continues to be undernourished (WFP 2006: 3–6). In the
early years of this century, a consensus grew between the Ethiopian
government, donors and I/NGOs that decades of interventions had not
led to sustainable assets at household or community level, and that it was
time to develop new policies to change this situation (GoE 2004: 1 ; Raisin
2001 ; Sharp et al. 2003: 129–39). This resulted in an integrated food
security programme, of which the Productive Safety Net Programme
(PSNP) is one element. The other two elements are the Voluntary
Resettlement Programme and Other Food Security Programmes.
Safety nets are social assistance programmes for poor people hit by
structural adjustment and economic transition (Subbarao et al. 1997: 1–14).
Safety net policies were subsequently developed by the World Bank
to assist the poor against asset depletion and prevent harmful coping
practices. Safety net policies have been implemented in the former Soviet
Union, Poland and Ukraine (ibid. : 24–67). They are a permanent feature
of social policy, not a temporary response to crisis, and take several forms,
such as cash transfers, subsidies-in-kind (e.g. food), public works, and
subsidies for housing or energy needs. The Ethiopian PSNP is directed at
food security, and is modelled after similar programmes in Bangladesh.
The government launched it in January 2005, in collaboration with
the World Bank, donors, UN and implementing agencies. By integrating
interventions, including food aid and food-for-work, it aimed to attain
food security for 5 million chronically food-insecure people by 2009. This
paper is especially concerned with the question of how selection proce-
dures aﬀected the primary target group of the most vulnerable people.
It examines only the ﬁrst phase of implementation of the PSNP, which
is used to illustrate the local implementation processes of the policy. For
evaluations of the subsequent implementation see Gilligan et al. 2008.
The paper examines early experiences with the PSNP in one of the
drought-aﬀected highland regions of Ethiopia, and describes and analyses
what happened during the initial phase of the programme during
the second half of 2004, when preparations for the programme were made
and beneﬁciaries selected. It is based on ethnographic ﬁeldwork of
four months in Selam Sefer and Fikre Selam, two villages in Wag Hamra
district (Amhara Region),2 where the policy shift to the PSNP was taking
place.
Selam Sefer has been a pilot area for the Save the Children-UK (SCF-
UK) Relief to Development (R2D) programme. Fikre Selam at the time of
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research was a non-intervention area for SCF-UK, but did get support
from regular governmental services. Sekota woreda3 was chosen for this
research because of the on-going relief operations and because of the
high level of destitution and food insecurity. The presence of a SCF-UK
project, besides being a subject of study, also made the area accessible for
ﬁeldwork and facilitated the arrangement of research permits from the
Woreda Bureau of Agriculture.
The paper is based mainly on ethnographic research, using qualitative
methods of primary data gathering such as participant observation. In
addition, Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques were used
such as focus group discussions. Using random sampling for selecting
the participants, focus group discussions were held separately with men
and women from the three wealth groups: poor, mid and better-oﬀ.
Key informant interviews were held with members of local institutions,
woreda and zonal oﬃcals, I/NGO workers, women’s associations and
local development committees, and with various societal groups such as
the landless, female-headed households, the elderly and the handicapped
(see Table 1). A number of key informant interviews were held in
the capital Addis Ababa with representatives of donors, INGOs, UN
organisations, embassies and universities.
Our study of the PSNP allows us to unravel the dynamics of policy
implementation between relief and development. We view the PSNP as
a far-reaching attempt to link food aid to food security, and hence as
a major embodiment of the desire to link relief to development, which
has been a dominant theme in the humanitarian agenda since the early
1990s. We are interested in the everyday politics of policy implementation,
examining how policy resources, ideas and activities are internally
and externally controlled and allocated throughout the implementation
process. One of the themes that we touch upon is how policy does not take
T A B L E 1
Methods of primary data gathering
Location
Focus group
discussions
Key informant
interviews
Selem Sefer kebele 6 10
Fikre Selam kebele 6 6
Sekota zonal and woreda government authorities 5
Sekota based I/NGOs 5
Addis Abeba based I/NGOs and academics 14
Addis Abeba based UN organisations 2
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place in a void, and cannot be analysed apart from adjacent policies. In
the early days of the PSNP in Ethiopia this was especially true for the
Voluntary Resettlement policy, by which the Ethiopian government
aimed to relocate people from the highlands to the lowlands. As we will
see, local authorities at the time and place of our research were geared
to making the PSNP instrumental to their bigger ambition to create a pool
of volunteers for resettlement. The other main theme we discuss is the
importance of discourse on food security. The ways in which actors
framed problems of food insecurity co-shaped the ways in which they
deﬁned solutions. The key ﬁnding of the research is that everyone in the
poorest wealth group in the case-study area was excluded from the PSNP
as an ‘ incentive’ to resettle.
The paper starts with an elaboration of our notion of policy and the
way we study policy in practice through ethnography. We then brieﬂy
summarise four discourses about food security. The centrepiece of the
paper analyses what happened with the beneﬁciary selection of the PSNP,
and how the responses of diﬀerent actors can be understood with reference
to these four frames. Our ﬁndings suggest that much more attention
should be paid to the institutional connections on which linking of relief
and development is conditioned.
A N A L Y S I N G F O O D S E C U R I T Y P O L I C Y I N P R A C T I C E
Food insecurity is the concern ofmany diﬀerent actors and institutions. The
ways in which these parties position themselves in the process is not a simple
function of their political–economic interests. Interests are usually neither
clear nor consistent, and even rights are often contradictory and subject to
interpretation. The way people act in their everyday politics is largely
conditioned by institutional, social and cultural patterns (Keeley & Scoones
2003). Policy can thus be seen as the result of a pattern of interaction
between diﬀerent participants, who try to shape the process in ways that
ﬁt their own perspectives of the problem and goals (Colebatch 2002). To
unravel these processes, we approach the ﬁeld through ethnography.
The ethnographic study of policy concerns the entire aid-chain (from
policy to practice, and from donor to recipient), its surrounding networks,
and the contexts in which the interventions take place (Gould &
Marcussen 2004; Long 1992; Mosse 2005). The ﬁrst dimension of
the ethnographic approach involves what may be called the social life of
policy, which means that policy is socially deﬁned by the actors involved.
Policy is the outcome of negotiation, and it cannot be taken for granted
that it is meant to be implemented according to its stated intentions. It
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is the result of interaction between diﬀerent stakeholders, who try to
make policy ﬁt their own perspectives of the problem and goals. The
second dimension concerns the question of how policy gets translated in
implementation. It steps away from the policy cycle model that views
policy as the systematic pursuit of goals and the end result of a purposive
course of action (Colebatch 2002). Instead, we view programmes as
processes (Mosse 2005) or emergent properties : the outcome of social
negotiation in which involved actors aim to appropriate the project
according to their own understanding, interests and ambitions.
Discourse analysis is an important aspect of ethnography, because
discourses are shapers of the ways in which actors understand and respond
to ideas, situations and actions. Discourses are more or less coherent sets of
references that frame the way we understand and act upon the world
around us. They are an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories
through which meaning is given to phenomena (Apthorpe & Gasper 1996:
2). Foucault has paved the way to study discourse as closely interweaving
knowledge and power. Its eﬀect is that certain ways of understanding
society, including its organisation and the distribution of power, become
excluded, whereas others attain authority. In Foucault’s work, discourse
appears as a structure that imposes itself on reality. It can indeed become
dominant and operate as a mindset that informs policy in unrecognised
ways. Leach and Mearns (1996) have for instance demonstrated how
environmental policy is driven by widely perceived and powerful images of
environmental change.
However, Norman Long (1992: 25) has pointed out that there are
always multiple discourses at work. ‘Since social life is never so unitary as
to be built upon one single type of discourse, it follows that, however
restricted their choice, actors always face some alternative ways of
formulating their objectives, deploying modes of action and giving reasons
for their behaviour’. Hence, there is a duality of discourse: it has an
ordering role, yet actors can strategically choose and use discourse in
deﬁning their policies and practices (Hilhorst 2003). It is through this
duality that we are able to study how discourses work in practice, to review
why and how they become important, and to see how they order
the practice of food security policies. One important aspect to take
into account is the way in which responses to policy are conditioned by
experiences with historical and parallel policies and interventions. When
policies are managed separately, they meet at the interface of intervention,
where actors interpret them as an ensemble. People’s memory of previous
interventions tends to aﬀect the way they imagine development relations,
and shape them accordingly (ibid.).
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This article takes this up by analysing the early days of the Ethiopian
safety net policy. It aims to demonstrate how local responses to food
security policies are informed by institutional patterns, discourses around
food insecurity and the articulation of policy with adjacent policy prac-
tices.
F R A M I N G F O O D S E C U R I T Y
Until the 1970s, food insecurity was basically addressed as an agricultural
problem, requiring adequate and regular food supplies to be produced to
feed the world’s population. Although technical questions concerning soil
quality, water supply and crop productivity remain important, and are
regaining attention in view of threats posed by climate change, alternative
socio-political understandings of food insecurity have since complemented
this concern. Food insecurity is a complex phenomenon where people
have to cope with an unfavourable contextual environment and are made
vulnerable by a range of socio-economic and governance processes.
Diﬀerent discourses have developed, shedding a diﬀerent light on the
problem of food insecurity. We distinguish four policy frames: ‘humani-
tarian’, ‘developmental ’, ‘psychological ’ and ‘political ’. Although in
reality the diﬀerent frames are partly complementary and intertwined, it is
useful for analytical purposes to draw them apart. While they can all be
attributed partial explanatory power, for the purpose of this paper we are
not primarily interested in their analytic value but in the way they are
embraced by actors engaged in the social negotiation of what causes and
solves food insecurity.
Humanitarian frame
In the classic humanitarian frame, food insecurity is viewed as a short-
term problem that must be addressed by bringing in food supplies. This
perspective on food insecurity, although few would condone it theoreti-
cally, continues to be determinant for food aid practices (Barrett &
Maxwell 2005). In reality, the situation in Ethiopia where food aid has
been a constant feature for more than twenty years represents a more
typical crisis than the short-term episodes that the humanitarian system is
designed for. This misconception, of food insecurity as an event, has
hampered eﬀective and timely interventions to relieve chronic food in-
security (Raisin 2001).
Faced with the yearly recurring food shortages in Ethiopia, humani-
tarian budgets for the country have quickly outgrown development aid.
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The humanitarian system was not equipped to solve food insecurity, be-
cause it lacks planning tools for development, is not allowed by mandate to
engage in structural programming or capacity building, and operates with
all the limitations that come with short-term funding cycles. Aid reforms
through food-for-work programmes in the 1990s could not overcome these
obstacles, and have been criticised for being ineﬀective and depoliticising
(Edkins 2000). New trends in humanitarian aid, such as the provision of
cash relief or the support for livelihoods, aim to further overcome the
artiﬁcial distinction between humanitarian aid and development (Longley
et al. 2006).
Development frame
The development frame views food insecurity primarily as a lack of
development. The basic ideas of Amartya Sen (1981), that households need
entitlements to food and that this is related to questions of governance,
feed well into this idea. In the 1990s, development actors incorporated
more consistently the idea that crises recur and are intertwined with
development processes, and started to build interventions on concepts
that could apply to crises as well as ‘normal ’ situations, in particular
‘ livelihoods’, ‘vulnerability ’, and ‘ linking relief to development’
(Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell 1994; Hilhorst & Bankoﬀ 2004).
Food insecurity in a developmental perspective is a complex issue
caused by a range of natural and human factors, including unemployment
in urban contexts, unreliable rainfall and climate change, soil depletion,
lack of agricultural inputs in rural economies, and lack of credit facilities.
Addressing food insecurity in a development frame requires integrated
policy in which a multitude of measures linking diﬀerent domains of policy
are integrated throughout the chain of implementation (FAO 1999). This
leads to sophisticated approaches that can be criticised for being overly
technocratic (Duﬃeld 2002).
Psychological frame : the dependency syndrome
Barbara Harrell-Bond (1986: 283) described a dependency syndrome
as ‘ the real and apparent lack of support for each other, the refusal to co-
operate under conditions where co-operation appears advantageous, and
the prevalence of destructive and anti-social behaviour … [dependency
syndrome is] a blanket term used for all the undesirable social behaviour
found in the refugee settlements ’. Although Harrell-Bond did see
unsociable behaviour and also symptoms of mental illness among the
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Ugandan refugees whom she studied, she concluded that the problem was
not dependency syndrome, but the fact that individuals and individual
needs were completely neglected by the aid agencies working in the refu-
gee settlements, largely because of the pressure these agencies felt to deal
with the large streams of refugees.
The notion of dependency syndrome has been challenged by Gaim
Kibreab (1993), among others, demonstrating that refugees tend to use all
the means at their disposal to cope with and improve their situation.
Kibreab concluded that the dependency syndrome was a widespread
myth and stereotype. Sharp (1998) likewise stresses the diﬀerence between
having a dependency syndrome and being dependent, where being de-
pendent is not an attitude but an economic condition. Nonetheless, the
notion of a dependency syndrome continues to play a major role in food
security policy (Lentz et al. 2005). Other theories that link food insecurity to
the mental state of people are post-traumatic stress syndrome (Ingleby
2005) and, lately, aspiration failure (Tanguy et al. 2008).
Political frame of governance
A political perspective on food insecurity or famine starts with the analysis
of its causes. It has been argued that famine is not in the ﬁrst place a failure
of some kind (of food-supply, livelihood, or climate), but the normal (and
functional) outcome of economic and political processes. David Keen
(1994; see also Duﬃeld 1993) starts his analysis of food crises in Sudan by
asking about the beneﬁciaries of famine: its perpetrators and bystanders.
This approach moves away from asking how households cope or do not
cope with their food insecurity, to probing the complex processes by which
social actors create the conditions in which food security is denied to
people.
Alex deWaal (1997) brought this approach powerfully home by labelling
famine as a crime. He attributes a major role to political regimes that
breach the social contract with their citizens and let or even make famine
happen. Devereux likewise states : ‘The problem of famine [in sub-Saharan
Africa] is political in nature and requires explicitly political solutions ’
(Devereux & Maxwell 2001: 148). This political frame can be associated
with solutions to food insecurity that are rights-based (FAO 2005).
T H E P R O D U C T I V E S A F E T Y N E T P O L I C Y I N E T H I O P I A
In the 1990s the Government of Ethiopia and the international com-
munity developed a National Policy of Disaster Preparedness and
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Management (NPDPM), which aimed to link relief to development by
using food aid to mobilise labour for public works in soil and water con-
servation. Public works as a strategy for delivering food relief seemed a
good way of bridging relief to development, but became problematic
in practice. Productivity and quality of outputs on public works have
generally been low and maintenance inadequate. The policy was eval-
uated as successful in the objective of saving lives, but failing to create
sustainable assets at household or community level (Raisin 2001).
The Ethiopian Food Security Programme (FSP) was developed to
replace the NPDPM. It is the outcome of negotiation between the
government of Ethiopia, UN organisations such as UN-OCHA, the donor
community (notably big donors such as the USA and the EU), and inter-
national NGOs. The principle of the Ethiopian PSNP corresponds to the
social security systems of developed countries : to provide a safety net
against sudden income shocks. It is meant to prevent the poor from losing
their assets and becoming destitute. It is organised as a permanent feature
of government social services, hence brought under the development
budget instead of the emergency budget. The support must be predictable,
guaranteed and timely, so that vulnerable households do not need to
resort to harmful coping measures that restrict their future options, such
as selling their tools and assets, and are encouraged to take economic
initiatives. Beekeeping, for instance, requires a relatively high investment
for a potentially high return, but is risky because it depends on rainfall.
The PSNP is designed to enable households to take such risks, by pro-
viding an income opportunity to fall back on in case the new livelihood
initiative fails. The PSNP takes a decidedly developmental approach to
relief that is intended to move away from the yearly emergency responses
Ethiopia has known since the 1980s.
The diﬀerence between the PSNP and other social security systems is
that this programme is not ﬁnanced from the national public spending,
but relies on international support. Its budget is set for US$107 million
yearly. The PSNP is embedded in the FSP as part of the World Bank and
IMF-supported Ethiopian Poverty Reduction Strategy. It contains many
components directed at local development ; block grants are made avail-
able to woredas for activities like water harvesting, irrigation, feeder roads
and household agricultural packages (GoE 2004). The FSP also includes a
voluntary resettlement programme to alleviate some of the pressure on the
depleted highlands without adding pressure on the city of Addis Ababa
which attracts most of the spontaneous migrants.
The PSNP was planned to be operational in 262 districts, with a total
of 5 million chronically food-insecure people included in 2005. These
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5 million people are taken out of the annual humanitarian appeal for
Ethiopia and addressed through the PSNP, with the aim to reach food
security for this group by the year 2009. Direct support is budgeted for the
elderly, the handicapped, and pregnant or lactating women. Those not
eligible for direct support can participate for a maximum of ﬁve days a
month in a labour-based programme, at a wage of 6 birr a day. This is
slightly less than the minimum average wage.
Because the PSNP is meant for a speciﬁc category of households,
targeting is very important. Whether a family is chronically food-insecure
is assessed through a mixture of administrative guidelines and community
knowledge. During community targeting exercises, the people from a
village come together in a public building to discuss the wealth status of
community members. To validate the process, the proposed list of PSNP
participants must be displayed in public for at least one week, to be
endorsed by a general meeting of villagers (GoE 2004: 23).
The PSNP is not meant to cover acute large-scale food insecurity, which
continues to be addressed by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Commission (DPPC). While the PSNP is about predictable needs, the
DPPC response is about exceptional humanitarian needs. In a bad year,
many households who are not PSNP beneﬁciaries, but live in chronically
food-insecure areas, will become temporarily food-insecure and will be
given relief through the DPPC. This also means that the implementation
structures of food-related policies have become more complex, with the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development responsible for the PSNP,
and the DPPC for acute emergencies.
T H E R E S E A R C H A R E A I N S E K O T A
This paper is based on ﬁeldwork in the food-insecure north-eastern high-
lands of Ethiopia, in the Amhara Region bordering Tigray. In Sekota, the
rural areas used to consist of scattered households throughout the hillsides.
However, given the eﬀorts at villagisation during the Derg regime between
1974 and 1987, and the current policy to centralise services, people are
increasingly grouped together in villages of twenty to sixty households.
Most people in Sekota are small-scale farmers, mainly growing staple
crops such as tef (a highly valued Ethiopian staple), barley, wheat and
beans. Communities in Sekota are structurally food-insecure. Sekota is a
marginal area that produces just enough for survival in a good year.
Roughly 50% of households rely on food aid to cover 30% of their annual
food requirements even in an average year of production (Chapman
et al. 2001). Destitution in Sekota has been increasing over recent decades,
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because of a complex array of factors such as land degradation, soil ero-
sion, deforestation and more unpredictable rains (Sharp et al. 2003: 174).
Sekota consists of rugged mountains and only 15% of land is plain. Due
to growing population pressure, increasingly steep slopes have been con-
verted to agriculture, which has led to high levels of environmental
degradation. Most households have fragmented land holdings with two
parcels of land: one close to the village and the other on the more
marginal slopes. Access to land is declining because of increasing popu-
lation pressure ; land is divided into smaller and smaller parcels, often too
small to support a family and therefore also known as ‘starvation plots ’.
After a bad harvest all households suﬀer, as better-oﬀ households, who
have livestock, struggle to ﬁnd fodder. Apart from land, wealth in Sekota
is based on four criteria : ownership of livestock and pack animals, avail-
ability of labour within the household, ownership of capital which can
be invested or lent out, and ownership of bee hives or bee colonies
(see Table 2). Today, there are fewer better-oﬀ people, eroding an im-
portant coping practice of the really poor, who normally use their linkages
with the better-oﬀ to survive. Migration in search of employment, even to
areas as distant as Addis Ababa, is common, especially in the hunger
season (July to mid September prior to the main harvest. In case of acute
food shortages, people tend to travel on foot to the lowlands to do day
labour or to beg.
The local administration maintains a relatively strong presence in
rural parts of Sekota, although, at the time of ﬁeldwork, 70% of positions
were vacant because few educated people want to work in remote areas,
and those who do prefer better remunerated employment with NGOs.
The lowest administrative unit in the villages is an elected council, the
T A B L E 2
Local criteria for wealth
Wealth group Rich (habtam) Mid (mekaklegna) Poor (deha)
% of households 15–25% 25–35% 45–55%
Average household size 7 5 5
Oxen 2 1 0
Cows 2 1 0
Sheep and goats 15–20 5 0
Donkeys 1–2 1 0
Mules 1 0 0
Chickens 4 4 4
Bee hives 10 2–3 0
Source : Chapman et al. 2001: 6.
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mengistawi budin. One level up is the kebele4 council, in which re-
presentatives of diﬀerent villages are elected. This council communicates
directly with the woreda line oﬃces in Sekota town. At the time of the
research, several governmental and non-governmental organisations
had programmes in Sekota in distributing relief, rural development or a
combination of both. These included the Organisation for Relief and
Development in Amhara (ORDA, an Ethiopian NGO responsible for
relief channelled through the government’s DPPC), Cooperazione
Internazionale (COOPI) and SCF-UK (both INGOs).
Although INGOs played an important role in Sekota during the time
of this ﬁeldwork, their relations with the government were often tense.
INGOs have been accused of bypassing local governments, competing
for funds, and poaching staﬀ. INGOs, for their part, have found the
government incapable of taking over their role and programmes. In re-
sponse, INGOs like SCF started to include authorities in capacity building
programmes.
A I D , A U T H O R I T I E S A N D P E O P L E I N S E K O T A
The PSNP followed decades of food security interventions. How has this
aﬀected the relations between local authorities and people in Sekota? This
research found that the authorities’ perception of poor people was mainly
a variation of dependency thinking. Woreda oﬃcials maintained that
food aid recipients are food-insecure because of their mentality. Food aid
recipients were seen as lazy, resistant to change, ignorant and unreceptive
to modernisation. The notion that local people thwart their own devel-
opment is much older than the rhymes of relief. In 1965, Levine (1965:
90–2) observed a similar attitude among oﬃcials and noted:
The view of Amhara peasant culture as incorrigibly recalcitrant and reactionary
is a rather shallow one. Amhara peasant culture contains potentialities for change
that are as real as its most rigid beliefs and its substantial antipathy to change ….
Modern-educated Ethiopians consider the peasant primarily an object for
manipulation and coercion who is often regarded as so backward that the only
way we can bring progress to them is through coercion and authoritarian
manipulation.
To sustain their claim that peasants suﬀer from a dependency men-
tality, woreda oﬃcials stated that they observed how food aid recipients
stopped weeding their ﬁelds because they counted on food aid, and that
they did not organise the necessary maintenance of public works built with
food-for-work programmes. People’s narratives, however, were diﬀerent.
In interviews Sekota peasants explained that they did not weed their ﬁelds
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because they needed to ﬁnd agricultural day labour in the ﬁelds of weal-
thier families to cope with short-term food needs. They also explained that
they needed the food-for-work programmes for their survival, and there-
fore had to wait until maintenance of public works was organised as an
income-generating project.5
Poor people related that food aid and other projects were unreliable and
not suﬃcient to provide sustainable survival. As a farmer and food aid
recipient in Selam Sefer said: ‘We only believe that food aid is going to
arrive when we have it in our hands. ’ Due to the large needs in the
country, varying but declining international donations, and the deliberate
reduction by the Ethiopian government of food aid budgets for fear of
dependency, food aid was spread thinly and rations were a far cry from the
1980s. In 2004, an elderly lady from Selam Sefer kebele reported:
The current level of relief does not help ; the payment [for Food For Work] is too
little, too late. From ﬁve children, four will be hungry. This year the harvest failed
and if it continues like this we are on our way to death (Focus group discussion,
women from poorest wealth group, Zondebai village, November 2004)
It is against this backdrop of local state–society relations, where people
found themselves coping within their limits and still going hungry, while
local authorities blamed poverty mainly on the attitudes of the vulnerable
people themselves, that the PSNP in Sekota started to be implemented in
2004.
Long before the actual implementation of the PSNP, rumours started to
circulate about its aims and possible implications. The late availability of
project documents and lack of accompanying training in the form of pol-
icy familiarisation created confusion about aims and contents of the
PSNP, which in turn created room for the local authorities to arrive at
their own interpretation of the policy. According to the national policy, all
chronically food-insecure households were included in the PSNP.
However, as targeting criteria were passed down from the woreda, a
situation was created whereby large numbers of families fell outside the
scope of the programme. The authorities deﬁned four wealth groups:
better-oﬀ, mid and poor wealth groups, and a fourth group consisting of
people eligible for direct transfers (see Table 3). It was made clear that only
the mid-wealth group was going to participate in the PSNP.
The actual distribution of households over the wealth groups as shown
in Table 4 was carried out by the Community Food Security Task Force
(CFSTF) in a meeting that lasted several days.6 The meeting became very
conﬂictual, as the stakes were high. Ironically, when people were placed in
the poor group, they would fall outside the PSNP, so everybody struggled
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to be classiﬁed as mid-wealth. As the table shows, 50% of the households
in these three categories were deﬁned as poor. The large proportion of
poor households was partly due to the fact that the authorities had just
started implementing a land reform that declared all slopes of over 30%
steepness as unﬁt for agriculture. This dispossessed many families from
their land, and they were consequently categorised in the poorest wealth
T A B L E 4
Wealth ranking for the PSNP in Sekota (Community Food Security
Task Force)
Wealth group
Proportion of the
population
Number of
households
Better-oﬀ 20% 2,000
Mid-wealth 30% 10,000
Poor 50% 20,000
Source : personal communication, Productive Safety Net Specialist, December 2004.
T A B L E 3
Grouping criteria and proposed intervention
Grouping criteria
Eligible intervention
according to local authorities
Group 1: Better-oﬀ Better-oﬀ households that
do not need aid
Recipients of extension
services
Group 2: Mid-wealth Labour-rich households To be addressed by PSNP
and other food security
interventions
Owners of good land
Food gap<3 months
Some asset base
Chronically food-insecure
households
Group 3: Poor Labour-rich households Eligible for resettlement
Landless households Not allowed to participate in
any FFW or similar
intervention in their kebele
Landowners with unfertile,
>30% sloping and
small-sized plots
Food gap>3 months
Group 4: Unable-bodied Unable-bodied households/
labour-poor
Lack of support from other means Direct unconditional transfers
Pregnant (after six months) and
lactating (up to ten months)
women lacking
support in their household
Source : personal communication, INGO programme oﬃcer, February 2005.
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group. During the meeting, the mid-wealth group was told to show
some ‘development ’ in the next two to three years or else they would be
reclassiﬁed as poor. This message could not be found in PSNP policy
papers, and was devised by the local authorities.
The approach to targeting in Amhara appeared to be in complete
contradiction to the rationale behind the Productive Safety Net Policy. It
was reasoned that the policy should be limited to those members of the
community who could graduate from the programme (i.e. break though
their dependency on food aid within three years), and who could be con-
sidered productive. This led to the exclusion of the poorest and chronically
food-insecure households. This translation of the PSNP was apparently
related to the voluntary resettlement policy that was simultaneously
taking shape as part of the Food Security Programme. A consultant stated
in December 2004: ‘The regional government has passed a directive to
exclude the above-mentioned category of households from any beneﬁts,
including humanitarian aid, so as to force them to go to resettlement sites. ’
This corresponded with the experience of Gwosana, a woman who
visited the hut of the researcher during the meeting where beneﬁciaries
were classiﬁed. She had walked out of the meeting angrily because she was
put in the poor wealth group for being landless. However, in her opinion
she was not poor because she had three cows. She also lamented that at
the same time she had been ﬁred from her job at the tree nursery of the
irrigation scheme because, as the project leader at the irrigation scheme
explained to her, ‘all landless households were supposed to resettle ’.
The key to understanding the way the PSNP was shaped in Sekota
could be found in the resettlement policy more than in the objectives of the
safety policy itself. Resettlement from the north-eastern highlands to the
relatively fertile and less densely populated lowlands of Ethiopia, sefera in
Amharic, has been a key strategy of the government for addressing food
insecurity. The ﬁrst large-scale resettlement and villagisation scheme in
Ethiopia was implemented under the Derg regime between 1984
and 1986. People were then forced to relocate, often at gunpoint. The
resettlement policy accompanying the Food Security Programme, which
also embodies the PSNP, is based on voluntary participation. It aims to
resettle people of the same ethnic and language groups together to avoid
conﬂict. In Amhara Region, a pilot voluntary resettlement project started
in 2002 and included 170,000 people. In the following years, the pro-
gramme slowed down because the number of participants became very
low.
At the time of ﬁeldwork, few people were interested in resettlement.
They based their decision mainly on the stories of people who came back
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from resettlement sites. Large numbers of people were so disappointed
that they returned to their home lands (FSS 2006). In Sekota there were
many returnees, whose living standard was often lower than before they
left. People’s disinclination to resettle was also informed by their sense of
identity and belonging to the highlands, as an elderly man from Fikre
Selam explained:
They call us to resettle. If we won’t resettle, we will not get relief and we know
that we cannot eat stone. We are not forced as such, but pressure is put on us,
especially on young people. The woreda will say, ‘ if you don’t resettle you will die
of starvation on your ﬁelds, as you will not get relief in the future ’. We are
peasants but we know that we cannot exist here without relief. The people who
resettled before us did not succeed; many of them came back, others died of
malaria. After seeing that, the people from this village didn’t want to resettle
anymore. We simply love our village. Good rain is much hoped for, rain will
help us to achieve food security.
(interview, 21.10.2004, May-Lomin, Fikre Selam kebele)
The government targeted resettlement from Amhara at 2.2 million
people before the end of 2006. This was not possible, but even the more
modest target of 50,000 households that the Amhara Region set for 2005
could not be met, and ‘only ’ 20,000 families were resettled in that
year (Pankhurst & Piguet 2004). The local authorities were thus put
under pressure to recruit as many volunteers as possible. Woreda oﬃcials
who failed to ﬁll their resettlement quota were held accountable, as
‘unconvincing leaders ’, and feared losing their position, or thwarting their
chances of promotion to a regional town. They also received a salary
according to their performance. Success or failure in recruiting people for
resettlement was thus directly felt by oﬃcials in their job security, status
and salary.
Recruitment was partly done by ‘resettlement sensitisation’. From
the second half of 2004, oﬃcials from woreda line oﬃces carried out
resettlement sensitisation in Sekota, using inﬂuential people in the com-
munities like teachers, health workers and development agents to speak at
sensitisation meetings. During these compulsory meetings, a rosy picture
was painted of the resettlement areas as green and fertile, and where grain
only costs 60 birr per sack instead of 175 as in Sekota. Information about
resettlement was in the meetings mixed with information about the PSNP,
and people were informed that the poor wealth group would no longer
receive food aid under the programme.
Oﬃcials justiﬁed their actions by claiming that beneﬁciaries could not
always see what was best for them (see also Scott 1998), and consequently
had to be shown the right way by the relevant authorities to lead them
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from dependency on aid to self-suﬃciency. They also found justiﬁcation
in the idea that people had developed a dependency attitude. ‘When the
poor go home, there is no food there. If we don’t get people to work
hard for the development of this area, the only other way is resettlement’
(interview, 3.11.2004, Selam Sefer).
The ORDA project coordinator in Sekota, responsible for relief
distributions, said (interview, 14.10.2005) : ‘One of my greatest concerns is
dependency syndrome. The farmers are expecting food relief, and refuse
to go to resettlement areas because they expect that they will be able to
survive on humanitarian aid here in Sekota. I expect the Safety Net policy
to solve the food aid targeting problems we are facing. ’
As a result, people from the poorest wealth group, ‘group three’ as they
were referred to in the community, were given the impression that they
had no option but resettlement. Even though the oﬃcials told visiting
donor missions that both group two and three were eligible for the PSNP,7
in practice they seemed to use the PSNP to exclude people and create a
pool to recruit volunteers for the resettlement programme.
L O C A L A U T H O R I T I E S A N D N G O P R O G R A MM E S
One of the biggest INGOs in Sekota at the time of ﬁeldwork was SCF.
This NGO had been present in the region since the famine of 1984, with
a wide range of programmes including food security monitoring and
support to early warning systems. It took the position that a major strategy
for households to overcome their food insecurity was through diversiﬁ-
cation of their livelihood activities. Coupled with small-town development,
this could in their view considerably enhance the carrying capacity of
the region. In 2004, SCF started the Relief to Development Initiative
(R2D) for Sekota woreda. Livelihood interventions within this programme
included goat restocking, loans with training for beekeeping, and grain
banks, for which the R2D project provided materials and a starting capital
of grain. The grain stored in the grain bank was mostly consumed in the
dry season from August to September (the hunger gap), although farmers
could decide to sell it for instance when the market price for grain is best.
SCF’s strategies diﬀered from those of the government, which preferred
resettlement for people with ‘ insuﬃcient ’ access to land. This contributed
to problems over the R2D programme, which enabled some families to
stay in Sekota and not to participate in the resettlement. This created
friction between the Sekota woreda authorities and the R2D programme
staﬀ. In 2004, the woreda authorities ordered the end of the goat re-
stocking programme. A SCF-UK employee in Sekota (interview, Sekota,
F OOD S E CUR I T Y I N E TH I O P I A 197
2.12.2004) said: ‘My assumption is that goat restocking was halted because
the Relief to Development project stands in the way of the resettlement
strategy, as it enables farmers to become independent from food aid. The
farmers have been known to say that they have support from the Relief to
Development project and therefore prefer to stay in Wag Hamra instead
of resettling. ’ A further indication for this was the subsequent measure to
stop food for work programmes and food distributions during govern-
mental campaigns to promote resettlement in the ﬁrst half of November
2004 (INGO employee, interview, Sekota, 4.11.2004).
During the shift to the Safety Net programme, several joint government
and donor ‘readiness missions ’ were carried out in Amhara in order to
monitor the progress made in preparing for the policy shift. The mission
members included donor representatives from World Food Programme,
UN-OCHA, World Bank and USAID, with representatives of the
governmental Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB). The
December 2004 readiness mission returned to Addis Ababa with alarming
results, and stated ( Joint Mission 2004) : ‘The Mission identiﬁed serious
misinterpretations of the Programme Implementation Manual (PIM) in
Amhara Region. Recognizing that the government took immediate ac-
tion, nevertheless there needs to be follow up to ensure that remedial
actions have been implemented. The situation highlights the need for
further clariﬁcation and adherence to the principles underscoring the
PIM.’ A donor representative visiting Sekota in March 2005 reported that
although the woreda authorities claimed that both the mid and the poor
wealth groups were included in the Safety Net, at the kebele level
the Development Agents told her that the poor wealth group was only
included in resettlement. In an email dated 19 April 2005, an INGO
worker in the case-study area conﬁrmed the exclusion of the poor wealth
group from the Safety Net.
: : :
The Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme is a far-reaching
attempt to achieve food security for vulnerable people who have been
dependent on food aid for more than twenty years without improving, and
even eroding, their asset base or productivity. The PSNP steps away from
the ad hoc and disintegrated set-up of relief-oriented assistance towards an
integrated approach that combines emergency measures with incentives
for development. It is a sophisticated programme that integrates policy
domains and depends for its implementation on the eﬀective linkages
of diﬀerent ministries and administrative units and layers. While this is
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already a daunting challenge for any professional apparatus, this
process was complicated by surrounding political processes and hindered
by prevailing notions about dependency.
This paper about the early implementation of the PSNP in Sekota,
Amhara Region, showed how in the case-study area the poor 50% of
the community were going to be excluded from the programme. The
implementation of the PSNP was, locally, derived more from the
bureaucratic need to enhance resettlement than inspired by the objective
of the policy itself. Due to targeting and sanction systems whereby local
oﬃcials’ salaries, reputations and job perspectives were bound to the
number of families they persuaded to resettle, oﬃcials had a personal
interest in prioritising resettlement over PSNP. Their practices were
geared towards denying relief as well as development opportunities to the
poorest households, other than the road towards resettlement. Although
nobody was literally forced to resettle in the duration of the case study,
people felt they were brought to a position where they had no option. The
practices of the oﬃcials were justiﬁed by appealing to the notion of
dependency mentality. By claiming that poor people had brought their
misery on themselves and blaming their poverty on their laziness, oﬃcials
could justify steering people towards resettlement. As a result, the beneﬁts
of the PSNP, which was designed to include chronically food-insecure
people, were reserved by local oﬃcials to the mid-wealth group.
Similar experiences to those discussed here for Sekota were noted in
other parts of Ethiopia and were a matter of concern for donors and
INGOs at the time of research. The Ethiopian government needed donor
support for its resettlement policy, as resettlers had to be supported with
food aid at least until their ﬁrst harvest. Donors were committed to the
package of the Food Security Programme, including resettlement, but
made their support conditional upon the voluntariness of participation
(Hammond 2004; Wilson 2005). But what is voluntary where people
depend on aid for their survival? (Hammond 2008) INGOs in places
like Sekota faced the dilemma whether to continue their programmes,
even when they were denied access to the people most in need. SCF-UK
considered that it was still possible for the most vulnerable people in
Sekota to achieve food security through a relief to development strategy,
coupled with small-town development. Their analysis competed with the
governmental policy that viewed resettlement as an unquestionable
necessity.
It is not clear how the linkages between national and local policy
implementation operated. The level of state control over policy
implementation at the local level is not exactly known. According to
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Keeley and Scoones (2003: 74), Ethiopia has always had a tendency
‘ towards authoritarianism, hierarchy, centralized rule and lack of trans-
parency’. Since the year 2000, however, the decentralisation strategy of the
Government of Ethiopia rendered lower administrative levels (woredas)
more power and relative independence. Keeley and Scoones observed
(ibid. : 91) that ‘ in many areas the federal level has become less important,
and it is in the regions that policy agendas are set, decisions taken and
projects implemented’. In Sekota, oﬃcials transformed the central policy
for participation in the PSNP into a strategy of coercive incentives for
resettlement.
The Productive Safety Net Programme is potentially very important
for the targeted beneﬁciaries of the PSNP (growing to 7.5 million in 2009).
It will also generate valuable lessons for linking relief to development
by achieving a linkage between food aid and food security. This paper
demonstrated that it remains crucial to monitor and follow the im-
plementation of such policies in practice. A major concern is how policies
that reﬂect the complexity of needs and realities of food insecurity can be
translated into programmes that are suitable to the capacities of local
bureaucracies. The other concern is to analyse how policies get translated
along the chain of implementation. These translation processes as we
have shown can be heavily aﬀected by related political issues, in this
case regarding resettlement, by the historically developed perceptions that
actors have about their situation, each other and themselves, and by the
politicised relations between implementers and the people they are sup-
posed to serve. It is only in the everyday realities of policy implementation
that these dynamics become visible, and it remains highly important to
follow closely how these processes unfold.
N O T E S
1. This paper was written as part of the Linking Emergency Aid and Food Security (LEAFS)
programme, conducted by Wageningen University and ﬁnanced by WOTRO Science for Global
Development of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO). We thank Gerrit Jan
van Uﬀelen for his valuable comments.
2. The ﬁeldwork was implemented in 2004 by Carly Bishop as part of her Masters thesis for
Disaster Studies.
3. Woreda: Amharic for the administrative level above the kebeles and below the zone. Each zone
is divided into woredas administered by a woreda council, which is accountable to the Zone Council.
4. Kebele : Amharic for the administrative level below the woreda, usually a cluster of villages,
covering about 800 ha. The kebele is also referred to in policy documents as Peasant Association (PA).
5. During this ethnographic ﬁeld research (September 2004–January 2005), use was made of par-
ticipant observation. The researcher was living alternately in two food-insecure kebeles : Selam Sefer
and Fikre Selam. In Sekota woreda, twenty-six key informant interviews and numerous informal
conversations were held with recipients and non-recipients of food aid. In each kebele a total of six
focus group discussions were carried out (wealth groups: rich, mid-wealth and poor).
200 CAR LY B I S HO P AND DOROTHEA H I LHOR S T
6. This meeting was closed to the researcher, and reconstructed on the basis of four interviews in the
weeks after the meeting.
7. Safety Net Advisor, international donor organisation, personal communication, March 2005.
R E F E R E N C E S
Apthorpe, R. & D. Gasper, eds. 1996. Arguing Development Policy : frames and discourses. London: Frank
Cass.
Barrett, C. B. & D. G. Maxwell. 2005. Food Aid after Fifty Years : recasting its role. London: Routledge.
Buchanan-Smith, M. & S. Maxwell. 1994. ‘Linking relief and development: an introduction and an
overview’, IDS Bulletin 25, 4: 2–16.
Chapman, C., D. Hailekiros, W. S. Kahsay & Y. Getachew. 2001. Wag Lasta Woina Dega Food Economy
Zone : baseline report. Addis Ababa: SCF-UK.
Colebatch, H.K. 2002. Policy : concepts from the social sciences, 2nd edn. Buckingham: Open University
Press.
Devereux, S. & S. Maxwell, eds. 2001. Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: ITDG Publishing.
Duﬃeld, M. 1993. ‘NGOs, disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn: political survival in a per-
manent emergency’, Development and Change 24, 1 : 131–57.
Duﬃeld, M. 2002. ‘Social reconstruction and the radicalization of development: aid as a relation of
global liberal governance’, Development and Change 33, 5 : 1049–71.
Edkins, J. 2000. Whose Hunger? Concepts of famine, practices of aid. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press.
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations. 1999. The State of Food Insecurity in the World :
when people must live with hunger and fear starvation. Rome: FAO.
FAO. 2005. Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of
National Food Security. Rome: FAO.
Forum for Social Sciences (FSS). 2006. ‘Understanding the dynamics of resettlement in Ethiopia’, FSS
Policy Brieﬁngs no. 4, January 2006, Addis Ababa.
Gebre-Selassie, S. & T. Beshah. 2003. Evaluation of Cash for Relief Project in South and North Wello Zones of
the Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia, report. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Economic Association/
Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute.
Gilligan, D., J. Hoddinott & A. S. Taﬀesse. 2008. ‘The impact of Ethiopia’s productive safety net
programme and its linkages’, discussion paper 00839, Washington, DC: IFPRI.
Gould, J. & H. Marcussen. 2004. Ethnographies of Aid : exploring development. Roskilde: Department of
International Development Studies.
Government of Ethiopia (GoE). 2003. The New Coalition for Food Security in Ethiopia. Vol. I. Food Security
Programme Proposal. Addis Ababa: GoE.
GoE. 2004. Productive Safety Net Policy Programme Implementation Manual (PIM). Addis Ababa: GoE.
Hammond, L. 2004. ‘The making of a good citizen in an Ethiopian returnee settlement’, in L. D. Long
& E. Oxfeld, eds. Coming Home? Refugees, migrants, and those who stayed behind. Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 187–205.
Hammond, L. 2008. ‘Strategies of invisibilization: how Ethiopia’s resettlement programme hides the
poorest of the poor’, Journal of Refugee Studies 21, 4 : 517–36.
Harrell-Bond, B.E. 1986. Imposing Aid : emergency assistance to refugees. Oxford University Press.
Hilhorst, D. 2003. The Real World of NGOs: discourse, diversity and development. London: Zed.
Hilhorst, D. & G. Bankoﬀ. 2004. ‘Mapping vulnerability ’, in G. Bankoﬀ, G. Frerks & D. Hilhorst, eds.
Mapping Vulnerability : disaster, development and people. London: Earthscan, 1–10.
Ingleby, D. 2005. Forced Migration and Mental Health : rethinking the care of refugees and displaced persons.
New York: Springer.
Joint Government and Multi-Donor Identiﬁcation Mission. February 2004. ‘Aide memoire for the
Ethiopia Safety Net Programme’ (unpublished).
Keeley, J. & I. Scoones. 2003. Understanding Environmental Policy Processes. London: Earthscan.
Keen, D. 1994. The Beneﬁts of Famine : a political economy of famine and relief in south western Sudan, 1983–1989.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kibreab, G. 1993. ‘The myth of dependency among camp refugees in Somalia 1979–1989’, Journal of
Refugee Studies, 6, 4 : 321–49.
Leach, M. & R. Mearns. 1996. ‘Environmental change and policy’, in M. Leach & R. Mearns, eds.
The Lie of the Land: challenging received wisdom on the African environment. Oxford: James Currey, 1–33.
F OOD S E CUR I T Y I N E TH I O P I A 201
Lentz, E., C. Barrett & J. Hoddinot. 2005. ‘Food aid and dependency: implications for emergency
food security assessments’, working paper series, Social Science Research Net, available at :
www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1142287.
Levine, D.N. 1965. Wax and Gold : tradition and innovation in Ethiopian culture. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Long, N. 1992. ‘From paradigm lost to paradigm regained? The case for an actor-oriented sociology
of development ’, in N. Long & A. Long, eds. Battleﬁelds of Knowledge : the interlocking of theory and practice
in social research and development. London: Routledge, 16–46.
Longley, C., I. Christoplos & T. Slaymaker. 2006. ‘Agricultural rehabilitation: mapping the linkages
between humanitarian relief, social protection and development’, Humanitarian Policy Group
research brieﬁng no. 22, London: ODI.
Mosse, D. 2005. Cultivating Development : an ethnography of aid policy and practice. London: Pluto Press.
Pankhurst, A. & F. Piguet, eds. 2004. People, Space and the State : migration, resettlement and displacement in
Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Society of Sociologists, Social Workers and Anthropologists.
Raisin, J. 2001. ‘Beyond the merry go-round to the relief-development continuum: prospects for
linking USAID relief and developmental resources in Amhara National Regional State (ANRS)’,
Addis Ababa: USAID Mission to Ethiopia.
Scott, J.S. 1998. Seeing like a State : how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and Famines : an essay on entitlement and deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sharp, K. 1998. Between Relief and Development : targeting food aid for disaster prevention in Ethiopia. London:
ODI.
Sharp, K., S. Devereux & Y. Amare. 2003. Destitution in Ethiopia’s North-Eastern Highlands (Amhara
National Regional State). Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, for
SCF -UK.
Subbarao, K. et al. 1997. Safety Net Programs and Poverty Reduction : lessons from cross-country experience.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Tanguy, B., A. S. Taﬀesse & S. Dercon. 2008. Aspirations Failure and Well-Being Outcomes in Ethiopia :
towards an empirical exploration. Available at : http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk/output/presentations/pdfs/
E13-Aspirations-and-WellBeing-Outcomes-in-Ethiopia.pdf.
Waal, A. de. 1997. Famine Crimes : politics and the disaster relief industry in Africa. Oxford: James Currey.
Wilson, F. 2005. ‘From humanitarianism to good governance? Reﬂections on a Danish-Ethiopian
aid model ’, in S. Folke & H. Nielsen, eds. Aid Impact and Poverty Reduction. New York: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 95–129.
World Bank. 1986. Poverty and Hunger : issues and options for food security in developing countries. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations. 2006. Annual Report. Rome: WFP.
202 CAR LY B I S HO P AND DOROTHEA H I LHOR S T
